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P. H. Del/mhs  
17-21 Oct 52

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DDP/CIA  
Wash 25 DC  
Nov 52

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CIA STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEAR 1955

(NSC 10/2/Activities - Cold War)

MAP REFERENCES: Current world map, Mercator projection, showing countries for which each Area Division is responsible.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Area Divisions (WE, SE, NE, FE, WH, SR) and their field organizations, plus those Headquarters staff elements which direct operations.

1. Scope and Purpose:

a. This plan is limited to FY 1955, in cold war context only, and to those types of CIA covert operational activities authorized by NSC 10/2, 10/5, and related papers.

b. This plan is supplemental to <sup>completely?</sup> [and does not generally rescind] Part II of the CIA/Opc Strategic Plan of 1 August 1951. The policy, assumptions, and missions there stated will continue as guidance except as modified by specific reference herein. Part II, Section VII, "Administration and Logistics," is specifically rescinded.

c. This plan and its annexes will be: (1) <sup>in outline</sup> [a minimum collation] of the factors which affect the selection of operational task objectives for FY 1955; (2) a generalized summary of tasks selected and their assignment; and (3) a summary of the logistic, functional, intelligence, and planning guidance which will control the detailed planning and programming and the execution of such tasks.

d. Approval of this plan will constitute only tentative approval of the specified task objectives as a matter of policy. Its purpose is to depict the <sup>cold war</sup> [target] program which US security <sup>objectives</sup> requires to be undertaken in FY 1955 and which will be undertaken, to the maximum extent permitted by CIA support capability. Its purposes are: (1) to authorize and direct further detailed planning; (2) to provide a basis for preliminary estimates of requirements of resources and special support apparatus; (3) to provide

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the foundation from which intensive staff review will develop the budget program and budget estimates for FY 1955; and (h) to be a base against which status and progress reports will be compiled and analyzed.

e. Approval of this plan and its annexes will not be taken in any circumstances as authorization to proceed with action. Authority for operational action will be given on the basis of individual operational programs at or just prior to the beginning of FY 1955.

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2. General Situation:

a. The general statement of situation, as given in the cited CIA/Op Strategic Plan, Part II, Section II, continues in force, except as follows:

(1) Item 4 of Section II is revised to read as follows: That Western Europe's military defenses under NATO will be insufficiently developed by the end of FY 1955 to prevent the USSR from overrunning continental Western Europe, at least as far as the Pyrenees, by D plus 12 months.

(2) Item 10 of Section II is revised to read as follows: Iran will not have both western orientation and internal stability in FY 1955. Task planning for Iran will cover alternative contingencies: <sup>if</sup> the possibility of holding Iran for the West continues in FY 1955, <sup>or</sup> if Iran has already been <sup>absorbed by</sup> lost to the Soviet Bloc <sup>by</sup> the failure or inability of the Western powers to take timely and sufficient preventive action.

(3) Item 16 of Section II is revised to read as follows: The stability of the political situation in the Philippines will have improved substantially by FY 1955, but some degree of outside vigilance and support may still be required to prevent relapse.

b. The following additional assumptions are made as a basis for FY 1955 planning:

(1) Soviet political stability:

(a) The Soviet government will be as stable, or more so, in FY 1955 in its own control of Russia as in FY 1953.

(b) The effectiveness ~~of consolidation~~ of Soviet control, by FY 1955 over FY 1953, will have increased in all areas now under the politico-military control.

(c) Stalin will still be alive in FY 1955 and apparently in control of the Soviet Union. However, contingent alternative planning for the event of Stalin's death will be developed.

(d) Malenkov will be the heir apparent to Stalin's power in FY 1955. The unlikely possibility of his death will be recognized only by draft broad-outline plans and not by detailed contingent plans.

(2) Hot War:

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**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION****(2) Hot War:**

- (a) World-wide hot war will not occur before or during FY 1955 and will not be imminent at the end of FY 1955.
- (b) The Soviet Bloc in FY 1955 will have the military capability to overrun Western Europe, at least to the Pyrenees, by D plus 12 months, to devastate the British Isles, to overrun the Middle East and establish a foothold in Egypt, and to overrun the Indian sub-continent and the mainland of Southeast Asia.
- (c) The Soviets will not employ such capability before or during FY 1955, and will continue to concentrate on non-military techniques, because of:
  - (1) Pragmatic reluctance to resort to conquest by military means as long as other means yield equal or better results at less cost.
  - (2) Failure of the US (covert) effort, by FY 1955, to reach sufficient scope to be a threat to win the cold war.
  - (3) Hope for deepening US depression and economic collapse.
  - (4) Success of Soviet peace offensive in increasing neutralism in Western Europe.
- (d) The Soviets will not precipitate further overt local war, such as Korea, before or during FY 1955 for fear of countering Western deflation and spurring moral and military rearmament.
- (e) By FY 1955, US military forces will have been relieved of active combat duties in Korea, but will be maintained in the theater at a lower level <sup>as a deterrent</sup> for reserve and support purposes.
- (f) CIA, therefore, will not have the active mission in FY 1955 of supporting US ground forces in overt local war.

**(3) Covert Operations:**

- (a) US covert operations: From FY 1953 to the beginning of FY 1955, US covert operations will continue to be sporadic, will be primarily defensive and counter-attack in character,

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coordinated, strategic

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✓  
 coordinated, strategic effort to win the cold war. However, such activities will increase in scope and volume, and vigorous strategic offense can be mounted by the beginning of FY 1956 if policy decision to do so is reached before the end of FY 1953.

(b) Soviet covert operations: The Soviet clandestine apparatus for covert operations will not have been substantially impaired by US effort by the beginning of FY 1955.

✓  
 (h) Peace Offensive: The communist peace offensive will have been successful to the extent of considerably decelerating the rearmament of the West, and communist propaganda will be effective in relaxing the present concern of the free world over the communist menace. Counteraction and reversal of such <sup>relaxation</sup> communist concern will be a major need in covert operations in FY 1955. However, such peace offensive will not mean suspension of Soviet effort. In any presented opportunity, where the USSR can disclaim direct responsibility, it will extend its control over areas now outside the iron curtain.

(5) US Economic Situation: The US will have a moderate business deflation in FY 1955. Serious depression levels will be avoided by the cushioning effect of armament and social security programs. However, the event will raise Soviet hopes of Western collapse and will be taken as reason and opportunity for expanded Soviet effort to win support and clandestine successes in the Western world.

c. Further amplification of the General Situation will be found in Annex A (Intelligence Annex) to this plan.


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**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION****3. Mission:****a. Controlling Policy Concepts:**

(1) General: The primary policy foundations for FY 1955 remain essentially as summarized in the CIA.Opc Strategic Plan of 1 August 1951, as revised, Part II, Sections III & IV. For amplification and changes, the ID/P policy book and original documents cited therein will be consulted.

(2) Policy perspective in relation to <sup>par. 3-6</sup> ~~the above~~ missions: The primary strategic objectives set forth as missions in paragraph 3-4 below, and the operational task objectives in the operational <sup>APPENDICES TO</sup> ~~annexes~~ <sup>ANNEX B</sup> of this plan, are framed as nearly as possible <sup>to be</sup> the results needed <sup>which</sup> require CIA to take action. Then specific tangible results, such

  
contemplated, the task statements are self-sufficient. However, many of these operational task statements require closer framing of the US policy attitude which is to be reflected in the performance of the task. In this respect the following concepts apply:

(a) International cooperation: To the fullest extent possible, the US seeks the accomplishment of Mission (A) through the strength and cooperation of all the nations of the free world. As a general principle, US propaganda or other covert operation toward Mission (A) will seek to reconcile and discourage racial, religious, and nationalistic antagonisms in the free world, and will encourage and support the maximum measure of international cooperation and unity of action on military, economic, social, and political affairs. Any action or line taken to the contrary will be restricted to the communist orbit or to the isolation or coercion of a non-cooperating nation outside the communist world.

(b) Psychological conditioning: In the pursuit of Mission (C) especially, but also in the propaganda aspects of activities under Mission (A), the action must include broad psychological conditioning as well as specific <sup>tangible?</sup> ~~(mechanical)~~ results. Every vehicle involved in performance of these tasks will emphasize, as a major purpose, the strengthening of the will and ability

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of the people of the free world to resist communist pressure in cold war, and to resist communist military advance and occupation in hot war.

(c) Colonialism: While US policy is sympathetic with the desire of peoples for free self-government, the general issue of colonialism cannot be met in the operations of this agency by establishment of and adherence to a general guiding principle to be observed in all circumstances. In cases where conflicts between the controlling government and the aspirations of the colonial area may be affected by CIA covert operations, the circumstances of the situation *shall be the determining factor* will determine, and central guidance will be sought if previous clear instructions have not been provided.

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(d) Free enterprise and democracy: [REDACTED]

attempt to sell the US brand of democratic, free enterprise system, and sympathy for the US viewpoint, only where such an approach will contribute to the achievement of the specific local objective. The major burden of selling the US as such rests on overt agencies and not on CIA. It is to be expected

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appeal and utility in achieving the specific results required. The intended use of such an approach will be clearly shown in proposed programs and projects when submitted for approval.

(e) Emphasis on the offensive: The planning of operational task objectives for FY 1955 for each area and country will be based on political and intelligence analysis to determine whether US interest requires minimum defensive holding only, pinpointed counter-attack to reduce the communist strength

and position, or

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and position, or aggressive offense. Where defense only is sufficient, CIA covert effort will be so limited. If counter-attack is required, it will be undertaken to the limit of the need and no further. The strategic emphasis will be to convert capability and effort to direct offense against the USSR and its satellites at the earliest possible time, with concentration on targets of greatest <sup>strategic (?)</sup> importance rather than mere opportunity.

b. Strategic Objectives and Concepts: The general character and scope of CIA missions in covert operations remain as summarized in the cited CIA/Opc Strategic Plan, Part II, Section V. The statement of area missions in Section VI, part II, of the CIA/Opc Strategic Plan continues except as previously modified in connection with the establishment of the SE and SR Divisions. <sup>See</sup> However, <sup>for</sup> convenience in planning, program management, and reporting, the US strategic objectives which CIA covert operations will serve in FY 1955 are re-stated and amplified as follows:

(1) Mission A: To force the reduction and retraction of USSR power and pressure outside the area of its present politico-military control.

(a) Under this mission, a minimum defensive holding posture will be maintained in all areas where USSR power and pressure is substantially noticeable or threatening, and such power and pressure will be aggressively counter-attacked wherever strong enough to be a danger to US position and interest. This mission will pertain in varying degrees in all areas outside the orbit of the Soviet politico-military control as it stands in FY 1955. Under this mission, assignment of operational task objectives is expected for WE, NE, and (for non-iron curtain target areas) for SE, SW, EE, and EW, and for staff elements directly responsible for conducting operations.

(2) Mission B: To impair USSR capability to wage hot war.

(a) Under this mission selective aggressive action will be taken wherever opportunity for substantial results is open. The area behind

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the iron curtain will be the primary target, but sporadic opportunities will occur throughout the free world and will be pursued. Some degree of operational task assignment is expected under this mission for all areas and staff elements directly responsible for conducting operations.

(3) Mission C: To build US capability to undertake immediate and effective covert operations in support of US military forces in the event of hot war.

(a) Under this mission, preparatory action will be required in varying degrees throughout the entire world. Heaviest concentration of effort will be in areas outside but adjoining the iron curtain, with as much preparation as operationally possible behind the iron curtain, and with selected action for specific purposes elsewhere. Some degree of operational task assignment is expected for all areas and for staff elements directly responsible for conducting operations.

(4) Mission D: To recapture the satellite periphery from USSR politico-military control.

(a) [Under this mission, in continued cold war circumstances,] full or even wide-spread effort to accomplish this <sup>mission</sup> objective during FY 1955 is not expected. Wide-spread build-up for later "triggering" and, where operational capability and circumstances <sup>are</sup> seem favorable, some sharply limited final effort may be assumed for FY 1955. Operational task assignments for iron-curtain target areas is expected from RE, SE, NE, FE, and SR.

(5) Mission E: To confine the USSR to its own boundaries (and render it internationally harmless).

(a) Under this mission, Fiscal Year 1955 is not expected to be a target year for major concerted effort. Action under this mission will <sup>consist of</sup> be build-up and preliminary harassment and reconnaissance. FY 1955 tasks will be delimited accordingly. Limited assignment of operational tasks may be appropriate for SR.

(6) Mission F: To assure continuing anti-USSR orientation in territory from which the USSR withdraws or is expelled.

(a) Under this mission, Fiscal Year 1955 action will be planned

only to the extent warranted by local planning under Mission D.

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(1) Inter-governmental cooperation: The willing cooperation of foreign governments or international organizations will not be sought except as follows:

Figure 1 is a line graph showing the number of cases (Y-axis) versus time (X-axis). The Y-axis ranges from 0 to 100, and the X-axis ranges from 0 to 100. The graph displays a series of peaks and troughs, with the highest peak reaching approximately 95 cases around time 10. The data points are marked with 'x' symbols.

2  
C  
12  
11  
11

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the *Agaricus bisporus* spores on the growth of *Agaricus bisporus* on the substrate. The concentration of the spores was 10<sup>4</sup> spores/ml (□), 10<sup>5</sup> spores/ml (△), 10<sup>6</sup> spores/ml (○), 10<sup>7</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>8</sup> spores/ml (×), 10<sup>9</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>10</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>11</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>12</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>13</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>14</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>15</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>16</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>17</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>18</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>19</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>20</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>21</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>22</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>23</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>24</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>25</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>26</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>27</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>28</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>29</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>30</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>31</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>32</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>33</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>34</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>35</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>36</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>37</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>38</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>39</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>40</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>41</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>42</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>43</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>44</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>45</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>46</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>47</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>48</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>49</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>50</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>51</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>52</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>53</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>54</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>55</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>56</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>57</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>58</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>59</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>60</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>61</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>62</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>63</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>64</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>65</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>66</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>67</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>68</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>69</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>70</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>71</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>72</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>73</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>74</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>75</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>76</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>77</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>78</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>79</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>80</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>81</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>82</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>83</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>84</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>85</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>86</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>87</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>88</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>89</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>90</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>91</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>92</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>93</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>94</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>95</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>96</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>97</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>98</sup> spores/ml (◇), 10<sup>99</sup> spores/ml (▽), 10<sup>100</sup> spores/ml (◇).

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**4. Tasks for Subordinate Units:**

**a. Geographic Area Divisions:**

(1) Operational Appendices: Brief checklist summaries of action required, country by country, to implement the broad missions of paragraph 3 b above, <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ given in appendices 2 through 6 of Annex B of this plan.

(2) Operational Plans: On the basis of the above checklist summaries, Area Divisions will draft operational plans in tentative form by 1 December 1952 as follows: One operational plan for each [country] group of proposed activities to be conducted at the command level of the country mission, and one or more operational plans for activities to be conducted at the command level of the area. Such plans will localize and amplify the general operational task objective, giving details of target and phasing, functional techniques to be used, and special operational requirements and problems.

(3) Target Policy: Regarding both the Operational Appendices and Operational Plans, the following standards will guide the inclusion and exclusion of targets:

(a) Such plans will exclude objectives which are clearly and completely impossible as actions during FY 1955, whether for policy, operational or support reasons.

(b) They will include objectives to which there are no known policy objections, <sup>(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)</sup> which are strongly needed during the year and which have a definite chance to reach the action stage in that year.

b. Staff Elements: Each staff element having responsibility for direction of operational action will draft an operational appendix (Appendix 9, Annex B), and corresponding operational plans, in the same way as an Area Division.

c. Functional Concepts of Operations: Annex B to this plan contains guidance by the technical staffs as to functional techniques to be used in achieving target objectives.

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**5. Administration and Logistic Matters:**

**a. Annex D to this plan:**

(1) Delineates the general structure of apparatus for provision of resources <sup>and</sup> to special support services.

(2) Outlines basic <sup>support</sup> arrangements with the Departments of State and Defense.

(3) Gives broad capability limitations for FY 1955.

(4) Provides planning guidance to operating and support elements.

**b. Appendices 1 through 5 to Annex D cover the following:**

(1) Personnel

(2) Training

(3) Logistics

(4) Medical

(5) Cover Facilities

(6) Communications ??

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**6. Command and Signal Matters:**

a. Appendix 1 to Annex B to this plan outlines CIA clandestine command structure, both operational and support, headquarters and in the field.

b. Appendix 6 to Annex I describes communications facilities and capabilities, and provides technical guidance as to the utilization of these facilities.

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Annex A  
INTELLIGENCE

1. This annex will be prepared in such form and content as developed by PP for cold war in FY 1955, with detailed amplification of the basic plan especially in the following elements:

- a. Political alignments and areas of control.
- b. Governmental stability and reliability.
- c. Military capability.
  - (1) USSR - offensive.
  - (2) US and allies - defensive.
- d. Clandestine capability.
  - (1) USSR.
  - (2) US.
  - (3) US allies.
- e. Scope and effectiveness of related US covert programs.
- f. Target area analysis.

2. Specialised Tabs for area or other detail may be provided for as necessary.

Annex B

COMMAND AND OPERATIONS

1. Appendices are attached as follows:

Appendix 1: Command organization structure and responsibilities as assumed for CIA covert operation in cold war in FY 1955.

Appendix 2: Operational appendix for Western European Division for FY 1955.

Appendix 3: Operational appendix for Eastern European Division for FY 1955.

Appendix 4: Operational appendix for Southeastern European Division for FY 1955.

Appendix 5: Operational appendix for SR Division for FY 1955.

Appendix 6: Operational appendix for Near East Division for FY 1955.

Appendix 7: Operational appendix for Far East Division for FY 1955.

Appendix 8: Operational appendix for Western Hemisphere Division for FY 1955.

Appendix 9: Operational appendix for FY 1955 operations conducted directly by staff elements.

# ANNEX B

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## APPENDIX

OPERATIONAL APPENDIX FOR  
DIVISION FOR FY 1955.

(COUNTRY EXAMPLE)

MISSIONS:      OPERATIONAL TASK OBJECTIVES — ↓	FY: (1955) TARGET COUNTRY: (1)					FY: (1955) TARGET COUNTRY: (2)				
	NO	YES				NO	YES			
3 CHECKLISTS OF OPERATIONAL TASK OBJECTIVES —	✓	(DISAPPROVED FOR THIS COUNTRY)								
		✓	✓	(APPROVED FOR BOTH INT & EXT BASE)						
		✓	(APPROVED FOR INT BASE ONLY)							
			(APPROVED FOR EXT. BASE ONLY)							
(1). MISSIONS (A) & (B) FOR NON-IRON CURTAIN TARGET COUNTRY.	✓	✓				✓				
	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		
2) MISSION (C) FOR NON-IRON CURTAIN TARGET COUNTRY.	✓	✓				✓		✓		
3) MISSIONS (B), (C), (D), (E), & (F) FOR IRON CURTAIN TARGET COUNTRY.										
DETAIL OF DRAFT CHECKLISTS IS ATTACHED.										



PFC/PC/EDel/mhs  
16 October 1952

NON-IRON CURTAIN TARGET LOCATION


MISSION (A): To force the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and pressure outside the area of its present politico-military control.

MISSION (B): To impair USSR capability to wage hot war.

OPERATIONAL TASK OBJECTIVES


1. By minimum or moderate general propaganda *to general populace*  
*or large opinion elements.*
  - a. To neutralize Soviet propaganda.
  - b. To favorably influence adverse and doubtful elements.
  - c. To encourage and stiffen friendly elements.

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5. To insure the political and economic stability of the country  
by provision of extensive <sup>military</sup> ~~mobility~~, financial, or economic aid to its  
government.

a. As supplement to overt US programs.

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16 October 1952

TARGET  
NON IRON CURTAIN LOCATION

MISSION (C): To build US capability to undertake immediate and effective covert operations in support of US military forces in the event of hot war.

OPERATIONAL TASK OBJECTIVES

1. To prepare for readjustment of local cold war program:
  - a. Termination.
  - b. Sharp reduction.
  - c. Continuation at same level.
  - d. Sharp D-Day expansion.
  - e. Gradual expansion after D-Day.
2. To have machinery ready for evacuation of personnel ahead of Soviet advance:
  - a. For US personnel.
  - b. For non-US personnel.
3. To establish communications and logistic facilities and reserves for hot war use:
  - a. Ready on D-Day.
  - b. Nucleus for later expansion.
4. To establish organization and program for organized resistance to Soviet advance:
  - a. Fully ready on D-Day.
  - b. Nucleus for post D-Day expansion.

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
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TARGET  
IRON CURTAIN LOCATION


MISSION (B): To impair Soviet capability to wage hot war.

- (C): To build US capability to undertake immediate and effective covert operations in support of US military forces in the event of hot war.
- (D): To recapture the satellite periphery from USSR politico-military control.
- (E): To confine the USSR to its own boundaries (and render it internationally harmless.)
- (F): To assure continuing anti-Russian orientation in territory from which the USSR withdraws or is expelled.

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2. To aggravate and



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11. After Soviet withdrawal or expulsion:

a. To establish a friendly government:

- (1) in cooperation with overt US action.
- (2) by clandestine action, with US overtly also.

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[REDACTED]

25X1C

c. To re-orient the population by intensive propaganda program.

[REDACTED]

e. To insure political and economic stability of the new government by military, financial, or economic aid:

- (1) supplementing overt US programs.
- (2) In lieu of overt US programs.

**SECRET**




Annex C

Functional Concepts of Operation:

The functional appendices attached hereto are the guidance by technical staffs concerning the functional techniques to be used in achieving target objectives. In relation to the strategic objectives and the operational task objectives, they will show for each type of functional activity its operational potential as a tool or method of action and the policy limitations on its use. Content of functional appendices and responsibility for their preparation and administration are as follows:

1. Technical Services Devices (TSD): Descriptions of operational characteristics and potential for any type of device or action within the cognizance of TSD.
2. Propaganda (PP): All activities which will demoralize, convert, encourage, or motivate people by spoken, written, or visual media, without physical violence and without ~~(mutually known)~~ personal contact ~~between agent and subject~~.
3. Political Warfare (PW): All activities which would demoralize, encourage, convert, motivate, or utilize people or groups, without physical violence and with ~~(mutually known)~~ contact between agent and subject.



- 25X1C 6. Counter-sabotage (PO): The prevention of sabotage by adverse forces.



8. Guerrilla Warfare (PO primary, PP secondary): Organized open rebellion by force of arms against an established government.

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Security Information

Annex D

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

1. The format, contents and responsibility for preparation of this annex and its appendices will be as developed by CAO. For their separate subjects, the appendices will include the following aspects:


- a. General structure of the apparatus for provision of resources or special support service.
- b. The basic arrangements with the Department of State and Defense for support to CIA covert operations in FY 1955.
- c. Broad capability limitations for FY 1955.
- d. Directives and guidance for planning by operating and supporting elements.

2. Appendices to this annex will include the following:

- a. Personnel, including friendly forces, troop lists, and support personnel.
- b. Training.
- c. Logistics including supply, and supply services facilities and construction services, transportation facilities and services.
- d. Medical.
- e. Cover facilities.
- f. Communications.

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Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000100130010-2

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

25X1A

NO.

DATE

25X1A TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. [Redacted] (PPC) 8 K	312			25X1A	
2. DD/P-PPC			13 Jul JB	[Redacted]	
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7. PP/PT/Ln	1309 K				
8.					
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10.					
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12.					
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14.					
15.					

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